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abstract
Objective: Metacognition is a multi-component psychological construct, characterised by the ability to identify and 
describe one’s own mental states and those of others. Evidence has been found for an association between deficits in 
metacognitive abilities and poor social functioning, low quality of life, psychopathology, and symptoms in personality 
disorders (pds). However, to date, there are few psychometrically validated instruments available for assessing the 
different components of metacognition. a semi-structured interview, the Metacognition assessment interview (Mai), 
has been developed to evaluate different domains of metacognition. in the present study, we investigated the psychometric 
properties of the Mai in an outpatient clinical sample. 
Method: the Mai was administered to a clinical population of 306 outpatients attending a private clinical centre. 
Exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis and correlation with instruments assessing alexithymia and 
interpersonal problems were carried out to examine the dimensionality and validity of the Mai.
Result: Explorative and confirmatory factor analyses revealed a good fit for both a two-factor model and a four-factor 
model of metacognition. The two-factor model yielded two main dimensions, which we named: Self domain, defined as 
self-reflection, and Other domain, defined as critical distancing from one’s own mental state and that of others. The four-
factor solution is composed of four sub-domains: monitoring, integration, differentiation and decentration. Moreover, the 
MAI showed good convergent validity, with significant correlations with both alexithymia and interpersonal problems.
Conclusions: These results confirm that the MAI is a reliable instrument for measuring metacognition and its different 
sub-domains. In particular, the MAI represents a useful and flexible instrument for the assessment of metacognition 
impairments in different psychopathologies and it can provide useful indications for the focus of psychotherapy treatment.
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introduction
Metacognition has been defined as ‘a set of skills 
which allow people to identify mental states, reasoning 
about them, and ascribing them to themselves and 
others, in order to regulate own mental state and 
interpersonal relationship’ (semerari et al. 2012). this 
definition highlights how metacognition is a multi-
component ability that enables us to comprehend our 
own mental states, as well as that of others. conversely, 
wells (2000) used the same term to refer to a set of 
beliefs about one’s own mental state that regulates 
attention processes and may be a contributing factor 
in the maintenance of dysfunctional processes, such as 
rumination. 
according to semerari and colleagues (2007), 
metacognition refers to the ability to understand 
mental states and it partially overlaps the concept of 
mentalisation Bateman and fonagy (2004) introduced. 
the principal difference between these two models 
is that mentalisation is viewed as a unidimensional 
function (fonagy et al. 1998), while semerari and 
colleagues (2007, 2012) considered metacognition as a 
multi-component function, in which single components 
can be selectively impaired. currently, metacognition is 
considered crucial in several areas of psychopathology 
(Dimaggio and Lysaker 2010, Gumley 2011). 
an impaired understanding of one’s own and 
other’s mental contents and processes seem to interfere 
with the development of an integrated and stable self-
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of reflecting upon different individuals’ mental states, 
identifying internal contradictions, conflicts and the 
rules typically triggering transitions among different 
states of mind (semerari et al. 2105). these abilities 
allow us to sustain goal-oriented and coherent behaviour 
and maintain a stable sense of identity. integration 
impairments overlaps, in part, with the concept of non-
integration of self and other representations, described 
in borderline personality disorder (Bpd) (ryle 1997, 
Kernberg 1975). 
the other domain refers to the ability to assume 
a critical distance from one’s thoughts and includes 
two metacognitive components: differentiation and 
decentration. differentiation indicates the ability to 
recognise the representational nature of mental states, 
clearly distinguishing between internal psychological 
contents and external reality. impairments in 
differentiation correspond to the ‘equivalent mode’ in 
Bpd, described by Bateman and fonagy (2004). this 
refers to a state in which fantasies are taken as real. 
this capacity to recognise the subjectivity of mental 
representations, and therefore, to take critical distance 
from our own representations, is fundamental for 
emotional regulation. decentration refers to the ability 
of taking on others’ perspectives in order to understand 
their intentions, thoughts and desires, independently 
from one’s own personal point of view. decentration 
is thus closely related to the concept of theory of 
mind (Premack and Woodruff 1978). As we noted in 
a previous study conducted on a community sample, 
psychometric properties for the Mai were satisfying. 
However, replication in a treatment-seeking sample of 
adults suffering from significant psychopathology is 
still needed (semerari et al. 2012). the current study 
is therefore based on data collected from a treatment-
seeking population. 
Our specific hypotheses are as follows: 
a) consistent with the previous study, the Mai has a 
two-factor structure with two separate domains: the 
self domain and other domain of metacognitive 
abilities. 
b) these two higher factors are comprised of two sub-
functions, respectively: monitoring, integration in the 
self domain, and differentiation and decentration in 
the other domain. 
c) The Self domain is specifically associated with 
alexithymia or a lack of emotional awareness. 
d) the other domain is correlated with interpersonal 
difficulties. 
representation and with the creation of positive and long 
lasting relationships (dimaggio et al. 2007a, Jørgensen 
2010). in persons with schizophrenia, metacognitive 
deterioration is strongly associated with diminished 
social skills and with neuropsychological and executive 
functions deficits (Lysaker et al. 2008, 2011a, 2011b). 
emotional awareness, which is a basic component of 
metacognitive abilities, has been found to be poor in 
many personality disorders (nicolò et al. 2011), and 
is significantly related to a wide number of clinical 
variables, such as poor engagement in psychotherapy 
(Ogrodniczuk et al. 2005, 2011), higher frequency of 
somatic complaints in depression (vanheule et al. 2007) 
and somatoform disorders (pedrosa gil et al. 2008). 
overall, metacognitive impairments have been 
described in patients with personality disorders (pds) 
(semerari et al. 2005, dimaggio et al. 2009, carcione 
et al. 2011), and they have been hypothesised to play 
a crucial role in the genesis and maintenance of pds 
(Bateman and fonagy 2004, dimaggio et al. 2007b, 
Dimaggio and Lysaker 2010). Poor metacognition 
has been globally linked with the severity of the PDs 
(semerari et al. 2014) and with a cold, distant and non-
assertive personality style (spitzer et al. 2005, inslegers 
et al. 2012). 
in contrast, high metacognitive capacities have 
been associated with greater emotional regulation skills 
and a better capacity to create stable interpersonal 
relationships (Bender et al. 2011). due to the clinical 
relevance of the metacognition construct, there is 
increasing awareness about the need for reliable 
metacognition assessment tools. the aim of the present 
study is to proceed with the psychometric validation 
of a new instrument named the Mai (Metacognition 
assessment interview), recently developed by semerari 
et al. (2012) in order to assess metacognition and its sub-
functions. semerari and colleagues (2012) validated the 
Mai in a sample of 175 non-clinical adults. the results 
showed two factors structure of the Mai: self domain 
and other domain. 
The Self domain refers to self-reflective mindreading 
abilities and includes two sub-functions: monitoring 
and integration. Monitoring is the ability to identify 
and label the components of one’s own mental states in 
terms of emotions, thoughts, motivations and desires. 
since the construct of alexithymia refers to the ability to 
recognise and label emotions, monitoring impairment 
partially overlaps with this concept (Bagby et al. 
1994). integration refers to a more complex capacity 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics and percentage of diagnostic characteristics in the two groups: Axis I 
diagnosis and Axis II diagnostic comorbidity for PD
note. pd = personality disorder; npd = no personality disorder; other = axis i disorders not included in the anxiety, Mood, 
eating and dissociative disorders; av= avoidant pd; dep= dependent pd; oc= obsessive-compulsive pd; pa= passive-
aggressive pd; de= depressive pd; pa= paranoid pd; st= schizotypal pd; sZ= schizoid pd; His= Histrionic pd; na= 
narcissistic pd; BdL= Borderline pd.
n sex age
pd 198 95M/103f 34(10.72) range (18–70)
npd 108 46M/62f 36(10.29) range (18–72)
percentage of axis i diagnosis
anxiety 
disorders Mood disorders
eating 
disorders
dissociative 
disorders other
npd 46.29 36.11 7.4 – 10.18
pd 43.21 32.66 7.53 7.03 9.54
percentage of axis ii diagnostic comorbidity for pd
av dep oc pa de par st sZ His nar BdL
2.01 1.50 2.51 8.54 15.07 5.52 2.51 1.00 3.01 3.51 6.03
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the self, and differentiation and decentration for the 
Other. During the interview, the participant is asked 
to narrate the most troubling interpersonal experience 
from the previous six months, a time frame selected 
in order to facilitate recall and permit test–retest, 
avoiding recalling biases, in the evaluation of changes 
during psychotherapy. the reported experience must be 
autobiographical and involve at least one other person, 
preferably one close to the interviewed, in order to 
assess the ability to understand others’ mental states. 
once the narrative episode is completed, the 
interviewer asks a list of questions, divided into four 
modules, to elicit and evaluate 16 facets, which are 
supposed to constitute the metacognitive sub-functions 
(four facets for each sub-function; see table 2). the 
interviewer assigns a score ranging from one to five to 
each of the 16 basic facets, based on a Likert scale (see 
table 2 for score details). an example of interviewer 
questions designed to stimulate the self domain are: 
‘How do you feel?’ and ‘What do you think?’ for 
monitoring, and ‘Do you often feel/think/behave 
like this?’ for integration. Examples of interviewer’s 
questions stimulating the Other domain are: ‘Did you 
take into consideration any alternative interpretations of 
what was happening?’ to elicit differentiation and ‘How 
did you think the other person would react emotionally 
to what was happening?’ or ‘What do you think he/she 
was thinking?’ to elicit the decentering ability. 
Methods
Participants 
the participants were 306 adult patients requiring 
treatment or consultation in an italian private setting 
from 2009 to 2012. the mean age was 34.72 (SD = 
10.67), ranging from age 18 to 72 years. one hundred 
and forty-one (46.07%) were male and 165 (53.92%) 
were female. exclusion criteria were the presence 
of neurological disorders, schizophrenia and active 
psychotic disorders, and current substance dependence 
(see table 1). Each patient was asked to give written 
informed consent, both for participation in the study 
and for data publication. the local institutional ethics 
committee approved the protocol.
Measures
Metacognition Assessment Interview (MAI)
the Mai is a semi-structured interview evaluating 
different capacities of understanding mental states, 
both in the self and in the other domains. the self and 
other domains are comprised of two sub-functions, as 
previously described: monitoring and integration for 
Table 2. MAI facets and scoring
Monitoring
1) the ability to recognise one’s own representations (thoughts and beliefs) 1  2  3  4  5
2) the ability to recognise and verbalise one’s own emotions 1  2  3  4  5
3) the ability to establish relations among the separate components of a mental state 1  2  3  4  5
4) the ability to establish relations between the components of mental states and behaviour 1  2  3  4  5
TOT
integrating
1) The ability to describe understandable and coherent links among thoughts, events, 
actions and behaviours 1  2  3  4  5
2) the ability to describe transitions between different mental states and explain the reasons 
why 1  2  3  4  5
3) The ability to form generalised representations of his/her mental functioning, taking into 
account continuity over time of patterns of thinking and feeling 1  2  3  4  5
4) the ability to reconstruct and describe to the interviewer one’s own mental functioning, 
providing enough information, without giving irrelevant and out-of-focus details, and 
giving a sense of order and coherence to the discourse
1  2  3  4  5
TOT
Differentiation
1) the ability to consider one’s own representation of the world as subjective and questionable 1  2  3  4  5
2) the ability to give plausible interpretations of events 1  2  3  4  5
3) The ability to reflect on and evaluate events (as opposed to a tendency to act impulsively) 1  2  3  4  5
4) the ability to distinguish between different modes of thought such as dreaming, 
fantasising and imagining 1  2  3  4  5
TOT
Decentration
1) The ability to recognise, define and verbalise other people’s emotional inner state 1  2  3  4  5
2) The ability to recognise, define and verbalise other people’s cognitive inner state 1  2  3  4  5
3) the ability to establish relations among the separate components of others’ mental state 1  2  3  4  5
4) the ability to establish relations between the components of others’ mental state and 
their behaviour 1  2  3  4  5
TOT
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and a comparative index (Akaike Information Criterion 
[aic]). since the tested models differ in the number of 
latent variables, we used an aic measure to compare 
them. 
according to statistical criteria reported elsewhere 
by different authors, a good fitting model produces 
consistent results on many different indices (ullman 
1996, netemeyer et al. 2004, Kline 2010). the total 
sample (n = 306) was randomly divided into two split-
half samples (n = 153); in the first group, an EFA was 
conducted and in the second group, a cfa. since non-
normality of distribution might affect structural equation 
Model statistics, the normality of observed variables 
was also assessed (Kline 2010). finally, a correlational 
analysis was carried out between the Mai (the whole 
sample) and the tas and iip scores in order to investigate 
convergent validity and construct relationships. spss 
20 (Mac version) software was used for data entering, 
coding and efa; amos 20 (windows version) was used 
for cfa.
results
Inter-rater reliability
The Intraclass Correlation Coefficients of the different 
Mai functions ranged from .55 to .72 for monitoring, .50 
to .67 for integration,.49 to 78 for differentiation, and.45 
to .61 for decentration. All analyses were significant, 
with p < .001, and showed good inter-rater reliability.
Reliability
the reliability of the scales was assessed according to 
internal consistency using cronbach’s alphas. cronbach’s 
alpha was .90 for the self domain (eight items), .91 
for the other domain (eight items), .88 for monitoring 
(four items), .83 for integration (four items), .79 for 
differentiation (four items) and .90 for decentration (four 
items).
Factorial analysis 
the KMo test and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity were 
conducted to assess whether the data were suitable for 
factor analysis. Both suggested that factor analysis was 
appropriate: KMo was greater than .70 (KMo = .92) and 
Bartlett’s test had a significance level (p) less than .01. 
the visual inspection of the scree plot and the eigenvalue 
greater than one suggested that up to four factors could 
be extracted. In particular, the first two factors explained 
most of the variance (57.39%), compared to the third and 
fourth factors (12.65%). according to our hypothesis, 
we first extracted two factors before then extracting 
four factors. the pattern matrix of the factor loadings, 
representing the different model solutions, is presented 
in tables 3 and 4. 
an oblique rotation was chosen with the intent of 
allowing factors to correlate freely. to this regard, the 
correlations between factors ranged from .3 to .67, 
confirming the substantial relationship between the 
different factors. in the interpretation and labelling of 
the factors, items were included as a factor if the item 
loading was above .30 and the secondary loadings 
differed by at least .10. in both solutions, all items loaded 
on the expected factor. In the first solution, the only 
exceptions were facet 2 of integration (‘The ability to 
The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV. 
the dsM-iv axis i and ii diagnoses were obtained 
using the structured clinical interview for dsM-iv axis 
i disorders (scid-i; first, spitzer, gibbon, & williams 
1997a) and the structured clinical interview for dsM-
iv axis ii disorders (scid- ii; first, spitzer, gibbon & 
williams 1997b), respectively.
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS)
the tas (Bagby et al. 1994) is a 20-item 
questionnaire that assesses alexithymia. it consists of 
three subscales: difficulty identifying feelings, difficulty 
describing feelings, and an externally oriented (or 
concrete) thinking style. The TAS is the most widely 
used and reliable measure of alexithymia.
Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (IIP)
The Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (Pilkonis et 
al. 1996, italian version: ubbiali et al. 2011) is a 47-item 
self-report scale that assesses interpersonal problems. 
It yields five subscales: interpersonal sensitivity, 
interpersonal ambivalence, aggression, need for social 
approval, and lack of sociability.
analysis
in order to evaluate reliability, the Mai three senior 
interviewers that were blinded to the clinical diagnosis 
administered, coded and scored the Mai. all raters had 
a minimum of at least five years (with an average of 
12.5) in cBt clinical practice. a preliminary inter-rater 
reliability evaluation was carried out on 20 subjects’ 
interviews [error margin = 22.36% and coefficient of 
variation = 66.6% (gwet 2012)], randomly selected 
from our database. to estimate the correlation of every 
single facet rated by the different judges, the intraclass 
Correlation Coefficient (ICC) was used. A two-way 
mixed absolute agreement model was applied to carry 
out the icc for each dimension of the Mai. additionally, 
the internal consistency of the scales was calculated using 
cronbach’s alphas. two explorative factorial analyses 
(efa) were conducted in order to assess the Mai’s 
structural validity relative to both hypothesised solutions: 
one with two factors (self and other domains) and one 
with four factors (monitoring, integration, differentiation 
and decentration). A Confirmatory Factorial Analysis 
(cfa) technique was used in order to analyse a priori 
theoretical models, specifying the numbers of factors and 
their correspondence with the indicator. 
on the basis of the results of the explorative factor 
analysis, a number of different models were examined 
that could fit the matrix of the 16 items of the interview 
and could be considered conceptually and theoretically 
plausible. in particular, we considered three competitive 
models: a) a one-factor model with Metacognition as a 
single, global dimension; b) a first-order factor model with 
two factors mutually correlated: Self and Other; c) a first-
order factor model with four factors mutually correlated: 
monitoring, integration, differentiation and decentration. 
Multiple statistical fit indices were used to determine the 
degree to which the sample variance–covariance data fit 
the structural equation model: absolute fit indices (Chi 
square/d.f. ratio and goodness of fit index [gfi]), 
incremental fit indices (Comparative Fit Index [CFI] and 
normed fit index [nfi]), non-centrality based index 
(root Mean square error of approximation [rMsea]) 
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Other factors (the first .37 and .38, the second .46 and 
.32, and the third .32 and .33). in the second solution, 
facet 4 of differentiation (‘The ability to distinguish 
between different modes of thought such as dreaming, 
fantasising and imagining’) loaded onto the integration 
factor, whereas item 1 of differentiation (‘The ability 
to consider one’s own representation of the world 
as subjective and questionable’) appeared complex, 
loading onto decentration (.43) and differentiation (.42). 
describe transitions between different mental states and 
to explain the reasons why’), facet 4 of integration (‘The 
ability to reconstruct and describe to the interviewer 
one’s own mental functioning, providing enough 
information, without giving irrelevant and out-of-focus 
details, and giving a sense of order and coherence to the 
discourse’) and facet 4 of differentiation (‘The ability 
to distinguish between different modes of thought such 
as dreaming, fantasising and imagining’). these three 
items are ambiguous, loading onto both the self and the 
Table 3. Factor Analysis of the 16 facets: Two-factor solution 
 seLf otHer
Mon4 .877 –
Mon2 .843 –
Mon3 .686 –
Mon1 .618 –
int1 .581 –
int3 .572 –
int4 .460 .327
dec3 – .931
dec4 – .853
dec2 – .719
dec1 – .676
dif1 – .656
dif2 .346 .435
dif3 – .383
int2 .373 .382
dif4 .320 .333
Note. Extraction: Oblimin Rotation. Factor loadings higher than 0.30 are marked. Self domain includes following facet:  MON1 = 
Monitoring, item 1;  Mon2 = Monitoring, item 2; Mon3 = Monitoring, item 3;  Mon4 = Monitoring, item 4;  int1 = integration, 
item 1; int2 1= integration, item 2;  int3 = integration, item 3; int4 = integration, item 4.other domain includes following facets: 
dif1 = differentiation, item 1;  dif2 = differentiation, item 2; dif3 = differentiation, item 3; dif4 = differentiation, item 4; dec1 = 
decentration, item 1; dec2 = decentration, item 2; dec3 = decentration, item 3; dec4 = decentration, item 4. 
Table 4. Factor Analysis of the 16 facets: Four–factor solution
integration Monitoring decentration
int3 .819 – – –
int4 .655 – – –
dif4 .531 – – –
int2 .473 – – –
int1 .427 – – –
Mon4 – .854 – –
Mon2 – .767 – –
Mon1 – .645 – –
Mon3 . .450 – –
dec3 – – .823 –
dec2 – – .789 –
dec4 – – .742 –
dec1 – – .709 –
dif1 – – .433 .426
dif2 – – – .553
dif3 – – – .520
Note. extraction: oblimin rotation. Factor loadings higher than 0.30 are marked.   INT1 = Integration, item 1; INT2 1= Integration, 
item 2;  int3 = integration, item 3; int4 = integration, item 4; Mon1 = Monitoring, item 1;  Mon2 = Monitoring, item 2; Mon3 = 
Monitoring, item 3;  Mon4 = Monitoring, item 4; ; dec1 = decentration, item 1; dec2 = decentration, item 2; dec3 = decentration, 
item 3; dec4 = decentration, item 4 ; dif1 = differentiation, item 1;  dif2 = differentiation, item 2; dif3 = differentiation, item 3; 
dif4 = differentiation, item 4.
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differentiation and decentration), all fit indices 
examined, the chi square/d.f. ratio (1.4), nfi (.91), 
cfi (.97) rMsea (.06, pclose-fit H0 > .05) and gfi 
(.90), were good. the four latent factors and the Mai 
items were strongly correlated, with standardised 
factor loadings ranging from .60 to 86; the interfactor 
correlations values were between .60 and .90. in order 
to compare the parsimony of the models, we analysed 
the aic values of the three models, which were, 
respectively, 363.07 for model a, 267.83 for model b 
and 220.52 for model c. Model c, evidencing the lower 
Confirmatory factor analysis 
the data sample was consistent with the assumption 
of normal distribution, as evidenced by the values of 
skewness (ranging from -.320 to .435) and kurtosis 
(ranging from -.943 to .352). considering the three 
models, examination of the analysis suggested that not 
all models appear tenable; specifically models b and c 
showed better fit indices, but model a did not (see table 
5). in model a (one-factor model with a global factors: 
metacognition), the chi square/d.f. ratio was consistent 
Table 5. CFA goodness of fit results for various factor structure models for the 16-item set.
Goodness of fit statistics
Models χ² (d.f.) χ²/d.f. ratio nfi cfi rMsea
pclose-fit H0 gfi aic
one-factor 
model a
287.37
(98)
2.93 .81 .87 .11 p < .05 .77 363.07
two-factor 
models b
179.83
(92)
1.9 .89 .94 .07 p < .05 .87 267.83
four-factor 
models c
130.85
(91)
1.4 .91 .97 .05 p > .05 .90 220.52
Table 6. Correlation between the MAI’s Self and Other domains and TAS-20 subscales and IIP subscales
 Mai self Mai others
Difficulties in identifying feelings 
(tas) -.290
** -.261**
Difficulties in describing feelings 
(tas) -.289
** -.192**
External oriented thinking (TAS) -.267** -.184**
tas total score (tas) -.356** -.276**
interpersonal sensitivity (iip) -.071 -.198**
interpersonal ambivalence (iip) -.166** -.205**
aggression (iip) -.109 -.194**
need for social approval (iip) -.082 -.109
Lack of Sociability (IIP) -.230** -.293**
**p < .01.
with a moderate fit (2.93). The NFI and CFI showed 
an acceptable fit (.81 and .87 respectively), whereas 
the rMsea (.11, pclose-fit H0 < .05) was inadequate 
and the GFI (.77) appeared to be just sufficient. The 
standardised factor loadings revealed moderate-to-
good (range = .56–.75) relationships between the latent 
factors and the Mai items. 
In Model b (first-order factor model with two 
factors mutually correlated: self and other), the chi 
Square/d.f. ratio was consistent with adequate fit (1.9), 
as well as were the nfi, cfi (.89 and .94 respectively), 
rMsea (.07, pclose-fit H0 < .05 ) and gfi (.87). the 
standardised factor loadings revealed moderate-to-
strong (range = .52–.83) relationships between the two 
latent factors and the Mai items, whereas the pattern 
of interfactor correlations evidenced a high relationship 
(.87). 
For model c (first-order factor model with four 
factors mutually correlated: monitoring, integration, 
value, can be considered the better solution.
Relationships between the MAI, alexithymia 
and interpersonal problems
The MAI’s Self domain showed significant (p < .01) 
correlation with the tas, both with the global score 
and with its three subscales: difficulties in identifying 
emotions, describing feelings, and externally oriented 
thinking. The MAI’s Other domain also correlated 
significantly with the TAS subscales, but to a lesser 
extent than did the self domain (see table 6). Moreover, 
the MAI’s Self domain showed significant correlation 
(p <. 01) with the iip subscales of interpersonal 
ambivalence and lack of sociability. In contrast, the 
MAI’s Other domain showed significant correlations 
with all iip subscales, except for the need for social 
approval subscales (see table 6).
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overlapping with the capacity of integration. therefore, 
the inclusion of this item in the differentiation function 
may need to be reconsidered. considering item 1 of 
differentiation, this facet described awareness that own 
beliefs may be false. this capacity is performed both on 
own thoughts and on those of others. therefore, this can 
be a reasonable explanation for the fact that item 1 of 
differentiation loaded both onto the differentiation and 
onto the decentration sub-domains. 
With regards to the confirmatory factorial analysis, 
all three examined models showed good values of fit, 
and therefore, they could be tenable. However, model 
b (first-order factor model with two factors: Self and 
Other) and model c (first-order factor model: monitoring, 
integration, differentiation and decentration) were better 
compared to model a (one-factor model with a global 
factors: metacognition). Specifically, in analysing the 
differences between the three models (a, b and c), the 
nfi, cfi, rMsea, gfi and aic indices suggested that 
model c was more robust than other models. according 
to our third prediction that the Mai self domain was 
related to alexithymia, the data showed a significant 
correlation with tas scores, underlying a good 
convergent validity. 
the results showed that tas partially correlated 
with factor 2, which belonged to the other domain. 
These findings can be explained in light of studies 
that argued that understanding the mind of the others 
depends, to a certain degree, on the awareness of one’s 
own mental states (Bird and viding 2014, dimaggio 
et al. 2008, gazzola et al. 2007). in particular, these 
studies showed that awareness of our inner states is 
crucial when we try to answer questions, such as what 
is going on in another’s mind or what is shared and 
what is different between our mind and another’s mind. 
even though the correlations between the self 
domain and the TAS were significant, they were in the 
moderate range. The low values observed make sense 
given that the Mai’s self domain assessed processes that 
were more complex than merely emotional awareness 
assessed by tas. indeed, the Mai also assessed the 
ability to identify one’s own beliefs and describe one’s 
own thought processes, which are quite distinct from 
detecting one’s own emotions and communicating them 
to others. 
with regards to the fourth hypothesis that 
metacognitive impairments in the other domain are 
a liability to interpersonal problems, correlations 
between iip subscales and the Mai’s other domain 
were consistent with our predictions. these results 
fit well with previous findings, which showed 
that difficulties in differentiation and decentration 
could predispose individuals to maladaptive social 
interactions and interpersonal conflicts (Dimaggio et 
al. 2007a, semerari et al. 2007). although we did not 
specifically predict that impairments in the Self domain 
were related to interpersonal problems, correlations 
with lack of sociability and interpersonal problems are 
not surprising. with limited access to one’s own wishes, 
goals, feelings and motives, connecting with others 
is more difficult (Lysaker et al. 2010). In particular, 
individuals with monitoring difficulties do not have 
easy access to their own mental states relative to those 
of others. consequently, uncertainty about the course of 
a relationship or tendencies to disengage is likely. 
in conclusion, the present data showed that the Mai 
is a promising clinical tool with good psychometric 
properties, and is able to assess different components 
of metacognitive abilities. since the interview was 
based on the narrative of the most recent and troubling 
patients’ interpersonal experiences, this clinical tool 
discussion
in this study, the psychometric properties of a clinical 
tool, the Metacognition assessment interview, which 
measures different aspects of metacognitive abilities in 
a natural everyday life setting, was tested in a clinical 
sample. overall, the Mai showed good psychometric 
properties that were characterised by a higher inter-
rater reliability, internal consistency and a good 
factorial structure. According to our first hypothesis, 
the factorial analysis confirmed the two-factor structure 
of metacognition previously found in a non-clinical 
sample (semerari et al. 2012), with two higher-order 
factors, named the self domain and the other domain. 
factor 1 (self domain) included all items related to 
the monitoring of inner states, with the exception of 
items 2 and 4 of integration, which saturated on the 
first and second domain. One possible explanation for 
item 4 (‘The ability to reconstruct and describe to the 
interviewer one’s own mental functioning, providing 
enough information, without giving irrelevant and 
out-of-focus details, and giving a sense of order and 
coherence to the discourse’) is that it describes the 
ability to both detect simple inner states and to evaluate 
if one’s own narrative is understandable by others. with 
respect to item 2 of integration (‘Describes transitions 
among different mental states and explains the reasons 
why’), a possible reason is that the item encompassed 
a general capacity for inference about processes and 
transitions between mental states. this inferential 
process is involved both when we think about our own 
mental states (self domain) and when we try to explain 
the mental states of others (other domain). factor 2 
(other domain) encompassed all items related to the 
ability to distance oneself from one’s thoughts and 
understand that others can have different point of views 
and beliefs. 
there were only two problematic items that were 
complex, loading on the self domain and on the 
Other domain: item 2 (‘The ability to give plausible 
interpretations of events’) and item 4 (‘The ability to 
distinguish between different modes of thought such as 
dreaming, fantasising and imagining’) of differentiation. 
concerning item 2, a person can provide plausible 
interpretation of events regarding him/herself, as well 
as the events of other people. with respect to item 4, it 
describes a general ability to recognise the quality of 
different mental states in ourselves, just as in others. 
therefore, it could be plausible that this ability belongs 
to the self domain, as well as to the other domain. 
according to our second hypothesis, the 
factorial analysis showed that metacognition could 
also be described as being comprised of four sub-
functions: monitoring, integration, differentiation and 
decentration. all of the Mai items loaded onto the 
expected factors, except item 4 of differentiation (‘He/
she is able to distinguish between different modes of 
thought, such as dreaming, fantasising and imagining’) 
that, contrary to our predictions, loaded onto factor 1 
(integration), in addition to item 1 of differentiation 
(‘The ability to consider one’s own representation of the 
world as subjective and questionable’), which loaded 
onto both factors 3 and 4 (respectively decentration and 
differentiation). 
item 4 of differentiation assessed to what extent the 
interviewee was able to reflect on the nature of his/her 
own representations, and to make distinctions between 
his/her personal representations and the real events. 
In order to make this distinction, a matching between 
different mental state representations is needed. Hence, 
these abilities could also be easily considered as 
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profiles of metacognitive impairment in different 
psychopathologies, and thus may contribute, in clinical 
settings, to the definition of treatment focus. 
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